PERMISSIVE JOINDER AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXCLUDING EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT IS INSURED by unknown
NOTES
PERMISSIVE JOINDER AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT IS INSURED
A PLAINTIFF is almost universally forbidden to inform the jury, as an
independent fact, that a defendant is insured.' The technical ground for
exclusion is irrelevancy. 2 Underlying the rule, however, is the assumption
that disclosure will prejudice the jury in its determination of liability and
in its award of damages.3 For this very reason, plaintiffs persistently strive
to convey the.fact of insurance at some stage of the proceedings. Their
attempts are a fertile source of objections in the courtroom, and often
result in mistrials and reversals.4 Almost without exception, courts hold
that a deliberate reference to insurance is grounds for a new trial, and many
courts extend the rule to cases where the reference is apparently inadvertent.5
The extensive litigation engendered by the rule seems wasteful in view of
the great variety of devices available for circumventing it. It is probably a
rare case in which the defendant is insured and the jury is not informed of
that fact.6 The technique most widely employed is to examine the jurors
on voir dire regarding their interest in the defendant's insurance company.
1. 2 WimoRe, EvmENcE § 282a (3d ed. 1940). Today the rule of non-disclosure ap-
plies in every state unless the insurance company can be made a party to the action.
Nebraska is the only state ever to have repudiated this rule by judicial decision. Jessup
v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1, 211 N.W. 190 (1926). And even in that state the defection was short-
lived, for in Fielding v. Publix Cars, 130 Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936), the Nebraska
Supreme Court returned to the original rule.
2. Courts hold that the fact that a person carries insurance does not tend to show a
generally reckless disposition on his part. But the carrying of insurance may be held
relevant if shown to have influenced defendant's behavior on the specific occasion in issue.
E.g., Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 558, 119 Atl. 705 (1923) (defendant had been
cautioned about his driving shortly before the accident; his reply, "Don't worry; I carry
insurance for that," held properly admitted).
3. See International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 Atl. 647, 650 (1925) ; LeMay
v. Young, 217 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Highway Express Lines v. Fleming,
185 Va. 666, 672, 40 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1946). See also WIaGMOaR, EVIDENCE §282a (3d ed.
1940).
4. See Notes, 28 A.L.R. 516 (1924) ; 56 A.L.R. 1418 (1928) ; 74 A.L.R. 849 (1931)
95 A.L.R. 388 (1935); 105 A.L.R. 1319 (1936). See also note 24 infra.
5. Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4, 163 S.W.2d 39 (1942) ; Gerry v. Ncugebauer, 83
N.H. 23, 136 AtI. 751 (1927). The rule applies to inadvertent references by counsel 11s
well. William Cameron Co. v. Downing, 147 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (ques-
tions by plaintiff's counsel referring to one of defendant corporation's employees as an
"adjuster," held prejudicial). The rule may provide a valuable device to an unscrupulous
attorney who sees that his case is going badly. By merely coaching one of his witnesses
to make an apparently inadvertent reference to insurance on cross-examination, he could,
if the ruse were undetected, thereby obtain a new trial.
6. See Note, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 110, 112 (1934).
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Practically all states permit such questioning in some form,7 on the theory
that a juror's interest in that company might influence his verdict.8 This
is obviously anomalous, because the basis of the non-disclosure rule is that
jurors should remain ignorant of an insurer's interest in the case.'
In addition to voir dire questioning, the fact of insurance is admissible
when it bears on a material issue or affects credibility of witnesses. Thus,
insurance may be revealed if it forms part of an admission of liability,10 or
if it tends to prove the master-servant relation," or to establish ownership
7. Most courts hold that voir dire questioning regarding jurors' interest in insurance
companies must be made in "good faith." But "good faith" is a phrase of many meanings.
The trend of recent decisions is to require some form of preliminary inquiry, such as a
conference with the judge, out of the jury's hearing, at which plaintiff's counsel inquires of
defendant's counsel whether defendant is insured. If in preliminary inquiry of this kind
it is found that defendant is not insured, questions concerning insurance are not allowed
on voir dire. Henry v. Tinsley, 218 S.A.2d 771 (Mo. App. 1949) ; Safeway Cab Service
Co. v. Minor, 180 Okla. 448, 449, 70 P.2d 76, 78 (1937). A few states further require that
the plaintiff show a "reasonable probability" that some prospective juror is interested in
defendant's insurance company. Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 442, 74 N.E.2d 601, 603
(1947). But in many states the question of what constitutes "good faith" is left largely to
the trial judge with no definite standards to guide him. See Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa
1251,239 N.W. 36 (1931) ; Stalcup v. Ruzic, 51 N.M. 377, 185 P.2d 298 (1947).
Some courts permit jurors to be asked whether they are interested in any insurance
company even when the defendant is not insured. Roselle v. Beach, 51 Cal. App2d 579, 125
P2d 77 (1942); Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 200 N.E. 762 (1936), 10
U. oF CiN. L. REv. 315.
8. Courts differ as to whether such interest, if it exists, is ground for clMllenge for
cause or merely provides a basis for peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Anderson v. Todd
Shipyard Corp., 63 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (if juror is employed by the insurance
company interested in the case, challenge for cause; if employed by some other insurance
company, no challenge for cause); Tatum v. Croswell, 178 Ga. 679, 174 S.E. 140 (1934)
(challenge for cause) ; Mortrude v. Martin, 185 Iowa 1319, 1332, 172 N.W. 17, 22 (1919)
(dictum indicating that it is basis for peremptory challenge only) ; Murphy v. Cole, 338
Mo. 13, 88 S.W.2d 1023 (1935) (challenge for cause).
9. The anomaly has been pointed out by McCoRuIcK, CAsEs ON EVIWENcE, 530 n.
(2d ed. 1948). The fact that voir dire questioning is permitted is itself an admission that
the rule of non-disclosure does not work. See Pavilonis v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St. 154,
159, 165 N.E. 730, 731 (1929), in which the court said, "The assumption that but for the
voir dire examination the jurors would not have suspicioned that a casualty insurance
company was interested in the case reflects upon the intelligence of the jurors."
10. Jackson v. Ellis, 213 Ark. 826, 828, 212 S.W.2d 715, 717 (1948) (defendant stated
following the accident, "Don't worry: we are fully covered by insurance and I'm taking
all the blame."); Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 60, 93 P-2d 680, 685 (1939) (defendant
stated, "My boy is careless.... If you won't prosecute ... our boy, we will do all we
can to help you get that $5,000 insurance."); Zigler v. Kinney, 250 Wis. 333, 27 N.W2d
433 (1947) (defendant stated that the accident was his fault and that he had insurance).
Contra: Crapson v. United Chatauqua Co., 27 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo. App. 1930) (defend-
ant's manager stated, 'I will admit we are in the wrong. I will get you all we can out
of the insurance company!').
11. E.g., Barg v. Bousfield, 65 Minn. 355, 68 N.W. 45 (1896) (fact that defendant's
insurance policy covered plaintiff tended to show that plaintiff w%,as employee of defendant) ;
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of the instrumentality causing the injury,1 2 or to show bias or interest on the
part of a witness." When the defendant argues his inability to pay a large
judgment, courts may consider that the subject of insurance has been
raised, 14 and may then allow comment by the plaintiff. 5 And a further
opportunity for the jury to learn of insurance is afforded by the practice of
some courts to hold that inadvertent references to insurance are cured by
striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard it."° In these
and myriad other ways 17 the jury may be informed in so many words that
an insurance company is in the picture.
Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 180 Mo. App. 96, 166 S.W. 883 (1914) (same) ; Biggins v.
Wagner, 60 S.D. 581, 245 N.W. 385 (1932) (policy tended to show that driver of truck
was defendant's employee); Delamar & Allison v. Ward, 184 Ark. 82, 41 S.W.2d 760
(1931) (fact that defendant made deduction for insurance from truck driver's pay tended
to prove that latter was employee rather than independent contractor).
12. E.g., Gayheart v. Smith, 240 Ky. 596, 42 S.W.2d 877 (1931) (ownership of taxi
involved in accident) ; Davis v. North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., 180 N.C. 74, 104 S.E.
82 (1920) (ownership of the plant where plaintiff was injured); Harper v. Highway
Motor Freight Lines, 89 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (ownership of truck).
13. E.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Trehern, 155 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1946) (insur-
ance company's adjuster) ; Kiewert v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 251 Ill. App. 342 (1929)
(insurance company's doctor who examined plaintiff); Scholte v. Brabec, 177 Minn. 13,
224 N.W. 259 (1929) (insurer's doctor who testified as expert witness).
14. Clark-Pratt Cotton Mills Co. v. Bailey, 201 Ala. 333, 77 So. 995 (1918) ; Stilson
v. Ellis, 208 Iowa 1157, 225 N.W. 346 (1929), 15 IowA L. Rav. 228 (1930); cf. M.
O'Connor & Co. v. Gillaspy, 170 Ind. 428, 83 N.E. 738 (1908) (plaintiff alleged medical
expenses and defendant introduced evidence to show that he had defrayed them; held
proper for plaintiff to ask questions designed to show that the insurer had reimbursed
defendant). Contra: D & H Truck Line v. Lavalee, 7 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
Strictly speaking, insurance has no more relevance when defendant raises it than when
plaintiff does, but courts are more lenient with a defendant because the rule seeks to
prevent prejudice against him.
When defendant's insurance protection is inadequate, he will often want to inform the
jury of that fact, but it is generally held that he may not do so. Fox v. Missouri Jobbing
House, 32 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1930); Piechuck v. Magusiak, 82 N.H. 429, 135 Atl.
534 (1926). But cf. Stehouwer v. Lewis, 249 Mich. 76, 227 N.W. 759 (1929) (where
plaintiff had made inquiries on voir dire, defendant was allowed to deny that he carried
insurance); Whitman v. Carver, 337 Mo. 1247, 88 S.W.2d 885 (1935) (plaintiff had
testified that defendant had stated he was insured; defendant was allowed to deny this
statement and to add that he did not know if he was covered by insurance or not).
15. E.g., Feore v. Trammel, 212 Ala. 325, 102 So. 529 (1924) ; Huhn v. Ruprecht,
2 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1928); Rice v. Garrett, 194 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
16. Lowe v. Poole, 235 Ala. 441, 179 So. 536 (1938); Trout v. Talerico, 237 Iowa
285, 21 N.W.2d 672 (1946) ; Trafamczak v. Anys, 320 Mich, 653, 31 N.W.2d 832 (1948).
See also note 5 siupra.
17. E.g., Andrus v. Hall, 93 Colo. 526, 27 P.2d 495 (1933) (in reply to question on
cross-examination, defendant indicated presence of an insurance company by testifying
that he had first met his counsel only one day before trial) ; Guarnaccia v. Weisensli, 130
Conn. 20, 31 A.2d 464 (1943) (photostatic copy of an accident report to the Motor Vehicle
Commissioner referring to insurance, held properly admitted) ; Chapman v. Independent
Laundry Co., 38 Ga. App. 424, 144 S.E. 127 (1928) (plaintiff permitted to show that
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Aside from direct references to insurance during the trial, other factors
may suggest it to the jury. Jurors may recognize defendant's attorney as
one who frequently represents insurance companies.18 Especially in small
communities, a juror may personally know that defendant carries insurance.
Newspaper accounts of the accident or of the suit may disclose the fact.0
The jury may know that in the case of some defendants, insurance is re-
quired by law.20 Most important of all, the jury may simply assume,2 1 in
the absence of any information, that the defendant is insured. The question
most frequently arises in automobile accident cases, and it is common knowl-
edge today that a large percentage of automobile owners are insured against
liability.
22
With so many devices available for suggesting insurance to the jury, it
is evident that the protection the exclusionary rule supposedly affords is
defendant had assigned his right of action on counterclaim to his insurance company) ;
Gegan v. Kemp, 302 Mich. 218, 4 N.W2d 525 (1942) (witness allowed to testify that his
prior inconsistent statement was prepared for his signature by an insurance adjuster).
18. See Nilles, The Right To Interrogate Jurors With Reference To Insurance In
Negligence Cases, 3 DAx. L. Rnv. 406, 408 (1931), in which the author, a practicing attor-
ney, points out that "lawyers, at least in this part of the country (North Dakota], are
thoroughly familiar with the antecedents of prospective jurors... ." The converse might
also be true in such localities. See also Stotts v. Love, 184 S.V2d 303, 309 (Tem. Civ.
App. 1944) (juror testified, "Some of them, I think, said he [attorney for defendant] vas
probably hired by the year by the insurance company."). Jurors are especially likely to
recognize defendant's attorney as a representative of an insurance company where the
same jurors are used throughout a term and thus become familiar with the various attor-
neys appearing in court.
19. In Hoffecker v. Jenkins, 151 F2d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1945), an article had appeared
in a local newspaper stating that it was "reported the defendants were covered by liability
insurance." The trial court instructed the jury to disregard it; held no error on appeal.
20. See Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Te:. 510, 516, 169 S.W.2d 46, 464 (1943) in
which the court states, "It is shown that the jury -was told by one of its members, who was
himself a truck driver, that the Barringtons had to have insurance in order to get a permit
to operate their trucks.. . ." Almost all states have compulsory insurance laws for
public carriers and certain other types of commercial vehicles. See Comment. 42 YAr=
L.J. 1103 (1933) ; Note, 39 IL.- L. Rav. 81 (1944). Massachusetts requires insurance as
a prerequisite to registration of any motor vehicle. 3 MAss. Amr. LAws c.90, §§ 34A-34J
(1946).
21. That jurors assume insurance is not entirely a matter of conjecture. See, e.g.,
Kellerher v. Porter, 189 P.2d 223, 230 (Wash. 1948) (after verdict, juror testified, "There
was quite a bit of talk about insurance during the discussion. ... I mentioned something
like, 'the Porters must have been insured. ") ; Sutherland v. Keene, 203 S.V.2d 917, 922
(Tenn. App. 1947) (juror testified that another juror said, "What are you worrying
about? The insurance company is going to pay it anyway.") ; Stotts v. Love, 184 S.V2d
308, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (juror testified, "Yes it [insurance] was mentioned... ").
22. The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters states that figures ron the per-
centage of insured automobiles in the United States are unobtainable. Communication to
the YA.E LAw JoupRNAi, dated April 17, 1950, in Yale Law Library. In some states,
however, the percentage of insured vehicles is very high. In New York, for example,
from 85% to 90% of all automobiles are insured. Buffalo Evening News, Jan. 11, 1950,
p. 49, col. 5; New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 8, 1950, p. 2, col. 4.
19501 1163
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
largely illusory. The ever increasing mass of reported decisions 21 on the
subject indicates that the rule serves only to promote quibbling in the court-
room, protracted litigation, and repeated reversals and mistrials. For if
the defendant is insured, it is a singularly unresourceful plaintiff who can-
not find a legitimate way of suggesting that fact to the jury. And if the de-
fendant is uninsured, the jury in its ignorance may assume the contrary and
the rule of non-disclosure prevents his informing them of the actual sit-
uation.24
Piecemeal remedies offer no solution. Courts might allow free comment
by both sides once there has been legitimate disclosure of insurance during
the trial. But this scheme ignores the fact that when nothing is said about
insurance, juries may often assume that the defendant is insured. Jurors
might be examined regarding their interest in insurance companies at the
beginning of the term rather than after they have been assigned to particu-
lar cases. 25 But questioning of this kind would still suggest insurance; and
the opportunities for disclosure during trial would be as great as before.
The futility of the present rule and the inadequacy of any piecemeal
remedies suggests that the only satisfactory solution would be a statute
permitting joinder 26 of the insurer as a defendant and allowing unrestricted
comment on the question of insurance. Once the insurance company has
been made a joint defendant, not only the issue of fault but all issues arising
between the insurer and assured would be decided in a single proceeding.
Thus the insurance company could plead its customary defenses, such as
lapse, non-coverage, and lack of cooperation.Y The statute would further
23. For example, the five A.L.R. annotations cited in note 4 sipra cover a total of
211 pages. In addition, A.L.R. lists over 400 cases on the subject since the latest annota-
tion. A.L.R. BLUE BooK OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECISIONS.
24. Of course, a few of the disclosure devices available to the plaintiff may also be
employed by the defendant. And insofar as the uninsured defendant may utilize them, he
can avoid the jury's prejudicial assumption that he is insured. See note 14 supra, If
joint defendants are involved and only one is insured, the uninsured defendant may not
disclose his lack of coverage even though questions have been asked on voir dire regarding
insurance. Malone v. Small, 291 S.W. 163 (Mo. App. 1927). For a discussion of the
plight of the uninsured defendant, see Note, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 362 (1932).
25. For various proposals of this type, see Hawkins, The Juror's Good -Faith in Issite,
[1948] INs. L.J. 7; Comment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 650 (1948); Notes, 52 HAv. L. Rav. 166
(1938); 43 MicH. L. REv. 621 (1944); 17 MINN. L. Rav. 299 (1933); 87 U. OF PA. L.
Rv. 234 (1938).
26. In references to existing statutes permitting joinder of the insurer, see note 32
infra, commentators have often erroneously used the term "compulsory joinder." A more
descriptive term is "permissive joinder."
27. Although such a statute would preserve all existing defenses, it would not re-
instate any defenses previously abolished by other statutes such as compulsory insurance
and financial responsibility laws. For discussion of the defenses and the changes made in
them by statute, see Billings, Impact Of Financial Responsibility On Automobile Liability
Insurance, [1949] INs. L.J. 871; Durland, Blood And Marital Relationshilps Under Tie
Cooperation Clause, [1949] INs. L.J. 3; Steensland, Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act, [1947] Wis. L. REv. 146; A Guide To The Automobile Policy, [1949] INs. L.J. 867;
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allow the company to amend the pleadings at any time prior to final argu-
ment, in order that the insurance company could interpose the defense that
the assured had failed to cooperate during the trial. When there are no
issues between insurer and assured, the judge would instruct the jury that
if it finds the assured liable it must return a verdict against both defendants.
If there are any issues of law between insurer and assured the judge would
decide these before submitting the case to the jury. If there are issues of
fact between insurer and assured, the judge would instruct the jury that it
could return a verdict against neither defendant, against the assured alone,
or against both defendants.u The statute should permit joinder 2 only
if proper service of process has been had upon the assured. Otherwise, since
most insurance companies can be served in many jurisdictions, plaintiff
would have wide latitude in shopping for a favorable forum.'- Nevertheless,
the statute should expressly authorize full disclosure and comment regard-
ing the existence or lack of insurance in every case, regardless of whether an
insurer has been joined as a defendant. 31
The only states with statutes similar to the one proposed are Wisconsin
and Louisiana.Z2 While for the most part satisfactory, these statutes are
deficient in some respects. They permit a plaintiff to make an insurance
company a defendant even in cases where service of process cannot be had
upon the assured, thus allowing a plaintiff to seek a jurisdiction with a repu-
tation for generous verdicts.3 3 Neither statute makes any provision for
Comment, 28 ILT. L. REv. 6,8 (1934) ; Note, 46 HAv. L. Rix. 1325 (1933). See also note
20 supra.
28. Since the insurer is liable only if the insured is liable, the judge would instruct
the jury that no verdict could be returned against the insurance company alone.
29. The statute should be worded to permit joinder of the insurer of any party who
may be subject to liability. This would include the insurer of a plaintiff against whom
a counterclaim has been filed. And see Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31
F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1940) (defendant permitted under permissive joinder statute to
join as defendants driver of car in which plaintiff wvas riding and driver's insurer).
30. The plaintiff, in loolkng for his favorable forum, would, of course, be limited to
those states having permissive joinder statutes.
31. To restrict discussion or disclosure by any "good faith" or similar rule would only
leave open avenues for further litigation concerning the exact definition of "good faith,"
and therefore retain one of the greatest evils of the present rule. Repetitious disclosure
and counsel's comments regarding insurance, however, would always be subject to the
trial court's power to exclude superfluous and cumulative testimony.
32. Wis. STAT. § 260.11 (1947); LA. GEN. STAT. § 4014A5 (Dart Supp. 1949). For
discussion of the problems arising under these statutes, see Coleman, The Dfc ndant In-
surance Company In Autonwbile Cases, 19 MAQ. L. RE%. 1 (1934) ; Leigh, Direct Actions
Against Liability Imurers, [1949] INs. LJ. 633; McKenna, Joinizg The Insurer And Ir-
sured In Automobile Cases, 17 MA.t2. L. Rnv. 114 (1933); Note, 20 CoRNxM LQ. 110
(1934). A few states have interpreted their compulsory insurance statutes to permit
joinder of insurers in those cases where the defendant is required by law to carry insur-
ance. See Note, 39 I11 L. REv. 81, 83 (1944). See also note 20 supra.
33. The Louisiana statute provides expressly for a suit against the insurer alone. LA.
Gsa. STAT. § 4014.45 (Dart Supp. 1949). The Wisconsin statute, while not explicit, has
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disclosure and comment in cases where an insurer has not been joined.
8 4
The Wisconsin statute, instead of requiring that all issues be settled in a
single trial, gives the court unlimited discretion to direct a separate trial on
any issues arising between insurer and assured.35 Finally, this statute per-
mits joinder of an insurer only in automobile accident cases.
It is not at all certain that there would be any marked increase in the size
of verdicts if free disclosure were permitted. The trial court could instruct
the jury that its verdict may be set aside if the damages awarded are un-
reasonable or if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence."0 The court
in its charge and defendants' counsel in argument could point out to the jury
that excessive verdicts will have the effect of raising insurance rates gen-
erally.37 Defendants could always argue to the jury that plaintiff is trying
been construed by the courts to permit such suits. Wis. STAT. § 260.11 (1947). See, e.g.,
Kujawa v. American Indemnity Co., 245 Wis. 361, 14 N.W.2d 31 (1944) ; Oertel v. Wil-
liams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1934).
Experience under the Louisiana statute demonstrates some of the unexpected results
of permitting a suit against the insurer alone. See, e.g., Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d
767 (5th Cir. 1948) (necessary diversity for federal jurisdiction held established despite
the fact that both plaintiff and assured were residents of Louisiana); Harvey v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 6 So.2d 774 (La. App. 1942) (plea of coverture is a personal
defense and is not available to a husband's insurer in a suit by wife) ; Rome v. London
& Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 So. 132 (La. App. 1936) (defense that City
Park Improvement Association was acting in a governmental capacity held personal to
the association and not available to its insurer).
34. Since passage of the act, however, the Wisconsin courts have been more liberal
in allowing references to insurance. Compare Doepke v. Reimer, 217 Wis. 49, 258 N.W.
345 (1935), with Pawloski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932). But in the
Doepke case, .rpra at 55, 258 N.W. at 347, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the
statute was not intended to justify "invidious insinuations" against the insurer or questions
asked solely for the purpose of "unduly emphasizing" insurance.
The absence of reported decisions in Louisiana on the subject of disclosure is probably
explained by the civil law rules prevailing in that state which regard a jury verdict as
merely advisory and Which permit review of questions of fact on appeal. As a result, it
has been estimated that approximately 98% of contested civil cases are tried before a judge
only, and hence there is no problem of jury prejudice. Communication to the YALE LAW
JouRNAL from Mr. Thomas W. Leigh, Attorney, of Monroe, Louisiana, dated April 18,
1950, in Yale Law Library.
35. A model statute, while preserving the judge's usual discretion to sever issues,
would specifically prohibit severance of the insurance issues where the sole ground for
severance is the claim that evidence of insurance would prejudice defendants,
36. The trial court could likewise order a remittitur if it regards the verdict as
excessive. A remittitur forces the plaintiff to accept either a new trial or a reduced
judgment. These devices will always be available to relieve any harsh effects of a per-
missive joinder statute in exceptional cases.
37. See Triangle Cab Co. v. Taylor, 190 S.W.2d 755, 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
(jury foreman testified that some juror said that "[h]e sure bet insurance rates for taxis
would sure take a jump after this case was over"). Jurors will probably be increasingly
concerned about the effect of verdicts on automobile insurance rates since a progressively
larger percentage of automobile owners, including jurors, carry such insurance. See note
22 supra.
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